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I. Introduction: The Threat to Human Dignity 
  Advances in biotechnology and medicine have produced enormous benefits for 
humankind. The use of technology has enabled humans to overcome many of the diseases 
and debilitating medical conditions that caused life to be shorter and more painful in the 
past. Given that the use of technology helped us to achieve the quality of life we enjoy 
today, one might think that modern technologies that enhance human functioning could 
promise even further benefits.  Humans with enhanced capabilities, freed of many of the 
human frailties we still experience, should flourish and lead lives with even higher levels 
of human dignity. However, when the concept of human dignity is raised in discussions 
of technologies that enhance human functioning, it is usually in order to caution others 
against using technology to achieve such goals.  
 It is the purpose of this paper to analyze the concept of human dignity as it 
functions in concerns about the use of technology to alter the human body. Despite the 
fact that the use of biotechnology has greatly improved our quality of life, it is still 
necessary to take precaution when pursuing new technologies in order to ensure that their 
expected benefits outweigh their risks. However, in recognizing that caution must be 
taken against the potentially harmful consequences that may result if we pursue 
technology unconditionally, equal caution must be taken so that we do not hold back 
from achieving future benefits due to unwarranted fears. It is the aim of this paper to 
analyze the concern that the use of technology to alter the human body is a threat to 
human dignity in order to determine whether or not it is in fact a warranted fear.  
 To examine whether human-enhancing technologies pose a threat to human 
dignity, I will focus on two works that are paradigmatic of what we might call ‘the 
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dignity debate’ concerning human enhancement technologies. The first work is The 
President’s Council on Bioethics’ report Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit 
of Happiness (BT). The second work is Leon Kass’ book Life, Liberty and the Defense of 
Dignity. In both works, it is stressed that using technologies to create certain 
enhancements poses a threat to human dignity. To briefly illustrate, the President’s 
Council raises the concern by asking, “As we discover new and better ways to “improve” 
our given bodies, minds and performance, are we changing or compromising the dignity 
of human activity?” (BT, 105). Similarly, in reference to certain uses of biotechnology 
Kass states: 
Profoundly should we hope and pray that the recent shocking reminder [9/11] of 
the vulnerability of all things human, and the recent stirring display of the dignity 
of ordinary human heroes, will encourage us to come to dignity’s defense also 
against the seductive temptations of a posthuman future (Kass, 21-22).  
 
As seen in the two aforementioned quotes, the concern that biotechnology poses a 
threat to human dignity is, according to both Kass and the Council, a matter worth 
considering. It is precisely because of the emphasis they place on human dignity that 
these two works will be the central focus of this paper. Additionally, the concerns raised 
in these two works will be closely examined because of their potential to exert a 
significant influence on society. If the concerns that are raised are taken seriously by both 
the public and those responsible for creating public policy, they could have a substantial 
impact on the approach taken towards the development of future technologies. Given this 
potential, it is important that the concerns be evaluated in order to ensure that they are 
legitimate and not simply the result if irrational fears. 
It should be noted before we proceed that the intention of the President’s Council 
in writing its report was not to provide airtight arguments against using certain 
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enhancements; rather its goal was simply to raise potential concerns in order to guide 
future thinking (BT, 22-23). This being the case, a critique of the report may appear 
premature. However, although the Council does not provide in-depth arguments against 
using certain enhancements, it does provide considerations intended to demonstrate the 
legitimacy of the concerns they raise. It is appropriate, then, to examine whether these 
considerations do, in fact, support the concerns in question.  
II. Therapy versus Enhancement  
II.A. The Distinction between Therapy and Enhancement   
In order to understand the topic under investigation, we first need to take a closer 
look at the contrast between therapy and enhancement and the role that the distinction 
plays in the present discussion. When most people use the term ‘therapy’ they are 
presumably referring to an instance in which an intervention takes place, the goal of 
which is to restore or raise a person to normal degree of health. Conversely, the term 
‘enhancement’ as it relates to alterations of the human body is usually taken to refer to 
those alterations that raise the individual above what is considered to be normal. It is not 
taken to refer to the restoration of the individual to normal health. The Council offers the 
following distinction between therapy and enhancement as being a useful starting place 
for the discussion:  
“Therapy” on this view as in common understanding, is the use of biotechnical 
power to treat individuals with known diseases, disabilities, or impairments, in an 
attempt to restore them to a normal state of health and fitness. “Enhancement,” 
by contrast, is the directed use of biotechnical power to alter, by direct 
intervention, not disease processes, but the “normal” workings of the human 
body and psyche, to augment or improve their native capacities and performances 
(BT, 13). 
 
On the surface, the distinction between therapy and enhancement seems to be 
useful for capturing people’s intuitions about which technological interventions are likely 
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to be acceptable and which are questionable. For example, chemotherapy is usually 
considered to be a therapy and is also considered in most cases to be a morally acceptable 
use of technology to alter the human body. In contrast, the use of steroids to improve 
one’s athletic ability is considered by most to be an enhancement, and in addition is 
considered by many people to be a morally questionable use of technology. In this way, 
the distinction between therapy and enhancement appears to be useful for categorizing 
those uses of technology to alter the human body that are intuitively acceptable versus 
those that are intuitively questionable.  
 However, upon further analysis it turns out that the boundary between what 
counts as therapy and what counts as enhancement is not quite as clear as it first looks. 
There are cases at either end of the therapy/enhancement spectrum, such as chemotherapy 
and the use of steroids to improve one’s athletic ability, which most people would agree 
fit easily into one of the two categories. At the same time there are cases that cannot be so 
easily categorized. Consider an instance of laser eye surgery in which an elderly 
individual who, due to the natural aging process, has his less than perfect eyesight 
restored to 20/20. On the one hand, this particular use of technology looks like it should 
be considered a therapy since it is merely restoring the individual’s eyes to what was 
once his normal level of functioning. On the other hand, it is also normal for eye 
functioning to diminish as a result of the natural aging process, in which case laser eye 
surgery could also be considered an enhancement since it is raising that individual’s 
functioning above what is normal for that age.     
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II.B. The Trouble with Determining Normalcy  
The discrepancy in this example, which is symptomatic of the therapy versus 
enhancement distinction in general, is that the distinction rests on the imprecise notion of 
what counts as normal human functioning. In recognizing this problem, the Council 
points out that it is extremely difficult to say what counts as being normally healthy (both 
mentally and physically) and similarly it is difficult to determine what counts as being 
impaired such that a technological intervention can be considered therapeutic versus 
being an enhancement (BT, 15).  
Some might say that what counts as normal is just the statistical mean of the 
entire human population, but as the Council points out, using the statistical mean to 
determine what can be considered normal, and thus what can be considered therapy 
versus enhancement, turns out to be problematic. One problem with adopting the 
statistical mean as an indicator of when it is acceptable to use technological interventions 
to improve human functioning is that it causes us to either break the link between therapy 
and disease such that not all curing of diseases would be called therapy, or it causes us to 
deny the conceptual possibility of a “universal disease” – a disease the entire population 
has. Why this is problematic is illustrated below. 
It seems clear that we would want to commit ourselves to classifying those 
technological interventions used to cure diseases as being therapies. Diseases presumably 
cause people to fall below (or even further below) normal human functioning, and to cure 
people of diseases is to return them to normal functioning (or at least closer to it). 
Technology used for the purpose of curing diseases looks to be the epitome of what we 
consider therapy, and it would seem odd if using technology to cure a disease, such as 
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AIDS, was considered not to be a therapy. What is less clear is why, if we were 
committed to classifying every use of technology to help cure diseases as being a therapy, 
that we would simultaneously be committed to rejecting the conceptual possibility of a 
“universal disease.”  
In order to clarify the matter, consider the possibility of there being a “universal 
disease.” It certainly seems conceptually possible that everyone in the world could have 
the same disease, for example the avian-flu. However, if every human in the world did 
have the avian-flu then it would be considered normal, according to the statistical mean 
of the population, for a person to have it. Thus, it would be considered an enhancement 
and not a therapy to cure a person of the avian-flu, since to do so would raise their level 
of functioning above the mean. Now, in order to remain consistent with our prior 
commitment to classifying every use of technology to cure a disease as a being a therapy, 
we would have to say in instances of “universal diseases” like the avian-flu that since it is 
normal for everyone to have it, that it is not actually a disease because if it was then it 
would be therapy to cure someone of it. Using the statistical mean to determine normalcy 
turns out to be problematic, therefore, because it prevents us from being able to commit 
ourselves to classifying all uses of technology to cure diseases as being therapies and to 
the conceptual possibility of “universal diseases,” which is something we should be able 
to do. 
To avoid this problem, one could say that the population for which the statistical 
mean is calculated should not merely be made up of those humans presently alive, but 
rather should consist of all humans both past and present. This would enable us to avoid 
the previously mentioned problem by allowing for the conceptual possibility of a 
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universal disease while at the same time permitting us to remain committed to classifying 
all uses of technology to cure diseases as being therapies. By using the larger population, 
even if everyone presently living were to contract the same disease the overall mean for 
normal human functioning would remain higher than that for the population of just those 
that are currently alive. Consequently it would still be considered a therapy to cure people 
of the universal disease. 
Although the abovementioned problem seems to be avoided by using the larger 
population, the use of a population that includes humans from the past actually causes 
even more problems than it solves. Consider what would be statistically normal in terms 
of oral health. Severe tooth decay and gum disease would most likely be the statistical 
norm if we were to take into account all humans from throughout history. Therefore, it 
would not be considered therapy, but enhancement for a person living today to have their 
gum disease cured and cavities fixed. Indeed, if what was normal was in fact determined 
by taking in to account all the humans that have ever existed it would probably turn out 
that many of the uses of technology that we classify as therapies would have to re-
classified as being enhancements. Hence, determining the statistical mean from this 
larger population is as equally problematic as using the population of those humans 
currently alive, and places us in no better position for determining what counts as normal.  
 Another reason the Council provides for the statistical mean being problematic for 
determining normalcy is that there is considerable difficulty in justifying the claim that 
those below the mean should be considered disadvantaged such that they are allowed to 
use technological interventions, which in this case would be considered therapies, to raise 
them to the mean, but that those at the mean should not be considered disadvantaged and 
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therefore should not be allowed to use similar technological interventions to raise their 
functioning since those uses of technological interventions would be considered 
enhancements. Those at the mean could also be considered to be disadvantaged when 
compared to those above the mean, and thus might claim that it is equally acceptable for 
them to use the same technological interventions despite whether one considers them to 
be therapies or enhancements.   
An even stronger criticism of using the statistical mean in order to judge what is 
normal is realized once one considers what would actually happen if this approach was 
taken. If everyone below the mean level of human functioning were brought up to that 
level, a new and higher mean would be established and all those previously thought to be 
normal would then actually be below the new mean. In fact, every time new individuals 
were brought up to the current mean, a new and higher mean would be established and 
those at the old mean would then be considered disadvantaged. This situation would not 
be resolved until all individuals were at the functioning level of the highest individual, 
which is surely not the desired consequence. Indeed it seems that many would consider it 
questionable to use technology to raise everyone’s mental functioning level to that of 
geniuses and everyone’s physical functioning level to that of Olympic athletes.  
This problem, which we will call the problem of the meandering mean, can also 
be seen if one considers what would happen if a large portion of the population were 
killed, thus shifting the mean. To illustrate, imagine that a significant number of 
individuals that were below the mean level of human functioning were killed in a natural 
disaster of some kind. The result would be that the mean would shift so as to be higher, 
and some individuals that were previously above the mean would then all of a sudden be 
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below it. In an instant, what counted as a therapy for an individual would change to 
become an enhancement. The problem with this is that it looks like the mean is too 
arbitrary of an indicator of what is normal and consequently is not adequate for 
distinguishing between what counts as a therapy and what counts as an enhancement.  
 To further illustrate, another consequence of using the statistical mean to 
determine what is normal is that if someone above the mean were to suffer a debilitating 
disease that decreased their functioning, but not so much that their functioning fell below 
the mean, any intervention that sought to restore their functioning to its previous level 
would be considered an enhancement and not a therapy. It seems most people would 
view this type of intervention as a therapy because it is restoring the individual’s 
functioning to what was previously normal for that individual.  
Yet, providing this kind of argument seems to advocate an individual baseline for 
normalcy, which is also highly problematic. Without going into great depth, one could 
see how an individual baseline for normalcy would be problematic when one considers 
those born with what most would call less than ‘normal’ functioning. For example, the 
individual baselines in cases where children are born deaf, and therefore what would be 
considered normal for them, is to not be able to hear, and it would be an enhancement, 
not a therapy, to alter their functioning so that they could hear.  Of course most people 
would consider it a therapy to use technology to help a deaf child to be able to hear, so 
maybe what they have in mind is not what is individually normal, but rather a kind of 
normalcy based on what they think the normal functioning of humans should be. 
 Most people have an idea of how a normal human should function, and perhaps 
that idea is what guides their assessment of what is normal. This seems like the most 
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plausible explanation of how normalcy is gauged in most people’s minds, and it looks 
like it might be the basis for people’s intuitions about which uses of technology are 
therapy and which are enhancement. But upon what does the notion of how a normal 
human should function rest? Is it based upon how people think our species was designed 
to function? Although people do have intuitions about normal human functioning and 
about what counts as therapy versus enhancement, it looks like people’s intuitions are just 
as arbitrary as using a statistical mean.  
In light of the problematic nature of determining what counts as normal, on which 
the therapy/enhancement distinction hinges, the Council admits that, “Although the 
distinction between therapy and enhancement is a fitting beginning and useful shorthand 
for calling attention to the problem (and although we shall from time to time make use of 
it ourselves), it is finally inadequate to the moral analysis” (BT, 14). Despite the fact that 
the Council remains comfortable using the terms ‘therapy’ and ‘enhancement’ to refer to 
various uses of technology, due to the unavoidably normative nature of the terms, for the 
remainder of this paper the term ‘alteration’  will be used instead to refer to those uses of 
technology that modify the human body.   
It is acknowledged that some might be concerned about the term ‘alteration’ being 
too general for the purposes of this discussion. There are many instances in which some 
form of technology assists in altering the human body, such as when a person cuts their 
finger with a knife, that would seem to be included if the term ‘alteration’ were used in its 
most general sense. However, in this paper a more restricted version of the term 
‘alteration’ will be used. The term ‘alteration’ will be used to refer to any use of 
technology to modify the human body or human functioning with the intention of that 
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modification being an improvement. The terms ‘therapy’ and ‘enhancement’ were also 
used to refer to those uses of technology to modify the human body with the intention of 
the modification being an improvement, however, those who used the terms sought to 
divide those intended improvements into two morally distinct classes. As was 
demonstrated above, that distinction turns out to be extremely difficult to make and to 
justify. By using the term ‘alteration’ to refer to the entire class of those uses of 
technology to modify the human body with the intention of improving it or its 
functioning, the same uses of technology can be referred to without the references having 
any normative connotations.  
III. The Benefit of Adopting a Macroscopic Perspective  
Believing that the distinction between therapy and enhancements is insufficient 
for moral analysis, both the Council and Kass turn to the possible consequences of using 
specific biotechnologies to alter human capacities in order to identify areas of possible 
concern. Here are some of the types of alterations the Council and Kass are concerned 
with: the use of genetic engineering to create “better” children; the use of psychotropic 
drugs to improve cognition and memory; the use of biotechnology to create enhanced 
muscles; and using biotechnology to extend the human lifespan (BT, 21-22). 
As the Council emphasizes in its report, although it may be important to examine 
the specific effects that each type of alteration creates, it is perhaps more advantageous to 
look at the bigger picture in terms of the effects that the widespread use of technology to 
create alterations may have on society (BT, 275-276). After all, it is not the technologies 
themselves that are potentially threatening, but the uses to which we put them in pursuit 
of our larger goals. Similarly, it may not be clear from each particular type of alteration 
 11
Benjamin Syzek Dignity and Human Enhancement 
that undesired consequences might follow. Most types of alterations — and certainly 
most of those that are voluntarily chosen by the subject — appear at first glance to 
significantly benefit those individuals who choose to pursue them. For example, the 
ability to allow people to live beyond the current maximum human lifespan looks to be 
hugely beneficial to the individuals who are granted those extra years. Viewed in 
isolation, each type of alteration may look beneficial, yet when a more integrative and 
macroscopic view is taken that might not turn out to be the case.  
As has been demonstrated in the Prisoner’ Dilemma, it is possible for every 
individual to make decisions based on his or her own rational self-interest, the product of 
which might nevertheless be an outcome that is collectively irrational. For instance, it 
may be in a baseball player’s rational self-interest to use steroids, assuming that the 
relative advantage the athlete would gain over the other players would outweigh the 
negative impact the steroid use would have on that player’s health. However, if every 
player or even a large number of players used steroids, then no relative advantage would 
be gained. Additionally, all those players on steroids would suffer the negative health 
effects associated with steroid use and would end up being worse off than they were 
before they took the steroids.   
However, even if the players were made aware of the sub-optimal outcome that 
would result if a large number of them were to take steroids, it would remain in each 
individual player’s self-interest to take steroids because if a player chose not to, and other 
player’s went ahead and used steroids anyway, then the player who chose not to would be 
at a significant disadvantage in terms of his playing ability. It would be rational for each 
player to use steroids despite the sub-optimal outcome that would result if a large number 
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of players did because the result of a player not using steroids, given that other players 
do, would be that that player would be at a severe disadvantage in terms of playing ability 
and might suffer a pay cut or even lose his job altogether.  
Relating back to the use of technology to alter the human body, what this example 
is meant to demonstrate is that if a microscopic view is taken it might look like each 
particular use of technology to create alterations is beneficial and in each individual’s 
rational self-interest, but the overall outcome may be sub-optimal if too many people 
pursue such alterations. The predicted harm may ultimately result from the emergent 
properties of the widespread use of the technology and not from each particular use in 
and of itself. 
For this reason, the point of view that the Council adopts in order to identify areas 
of concern is the more integrative and macroscopic view, which is chosen in order to 
better analyze the impact that widespread uses of technology to create alterations will 
have on society as a whole. Additionally, the Council chooses to evaluate the topic in 
terms of the effects that technologically facilitated alterations have on our desires and 
goals as well as the consequences that the uses of technology to create alteration will 
have when used to satisfy those desires and goals. The Council states that, “By 
structuring the inquiry around the desires and goals of human beings, we adopt the 
perspective of human experience and human aspiration, rather than the perspective of 
technique and power” (BT, 21). In other words, by structuring their inquiry around the 
desires and goals of human beings, they can better examine the impact that the 
widespread uses of technologically facilitated alterations will have on our current way of 
life.  
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Concerns about the potential effects of alterations are commonly raised with 
respect to their widespread uses because it is at this level that ethical issues emerge. This 
paper will address the concerns that are raised at this level as well; however, caution 
needs to be taken in order to avoid false universalizations that would distract us from the 
task at hand. Although there are many legitimate concerns that arise with respect to the 
potential consequences of the widespread use of alterations, not all alterations are likely 
to become widespread. Before considering the potential harms, one should consider both 
the feasibility and the likelihood that a particular alteration is going to be used by a 
significant number of individuals. For example, in relation to in vitro fertilization, it 
seems fair to ask, taking into account its cost and the appeal of reproduction through 
sexual intercourse, whether or not it is likely to be used by a significant proportion of the 
population. The point is that while there may be ethical issues that would arise if a 
particular alteration were to become widespread it is not always the case that widespread 
use is feasible or likely. The likelihood of a particular consequence is a vital element that 
needs to be considered when conducting a moral cost/benefit analysis, and if it turns out 
that a particular outcome is highly unlikely it should be given significantly less weight or 
be discounted when making a decision based on that analysis.  
It should also be mentioned that not all of the ethical issues that arise due to the 
widespread use of alterations pertain to human dignity. It does not follow that just 
because there are legitimate concerns related to an alteration’s widespread use that it 
necessarily is a threat to human dignity. To provide a concrete example, it may be the 
case that the widespread use of alterations to extend the human lifespan would have 
harmful consequences such as contributing to overpopulation. This is a legitimate 
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concern, but it is not obviously the case that its widespread use would be a threat to 
human dignity. As was mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the goal here is not to 
distinguish in every instance which consequences might threaten human dignity and 
which are unrelated, rather it is merely to make explicit some of the issues that may serve 
as distractions.  
IV. Human Dignity 
IV.A. What Does ‘Dignity’ Mean?  
At this point I turn to the concept of dignity, and its function in arguments about 
human alterations, in order to clarify what is meant when one claims that a particular 
alteration would violate or lessen human dignity. This discussion equally applies to 
instances when the concept of dignity is used in order to support the claim that a 
particular alteration would increase human dignity, but since the concept is most 
commonly used in terms of it being violated or lessened, I will focus my analysis on 
arguments that use it in that way.  
As Kass points out, “The first trouble with ‘dignity’ is that it is an abstraction, and 
a soft one at that” (Kass, 15). He goes on to say that “harm” is also an abstraction, but 
that, “‘[d]ignity’ is much more elusive, so much so that many in the field of bioethics 
mock it or treat it as merely ‘symbolic’ value – meaning that it has no concrete reality.” 
Taking Kass’ comment to heart, it is the intention in this paper not to mock the concept of 
dignity, but rather to consider the concept seriously in order to discover if it does in fact 
lend any assistance in determining whether or not to pursue certain human alterations.  
It should be pointed out that in the context of debates about alterations it is not the 
concept of ‘dignity’ that is most often invoked, but rather the concept of ‘human dignity.’ 
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In pursuing certain alterations, concerns about human dignity are often encased within 
another concern which is that creating such alterations would make us inhuman or would 
be dehumanizing in some way. The Council expresses this exact concern by saying that:  
If there are essential reasons to be concerned about these activities, and where 
they may lead us, we sense that it may have something to do with challenges to 
what is naturally human, what is humanly dignified, or to the attitudes that show 
proper respect for what is naturally and dignifiedly human (BT, 286).  
 
This concern raises the question of whether or not there is such a thing as a 
distinctly human dignity, and if there is, why is it that humans are capable of possessing 
it, but not other species. For if it turns out that the type of dignity in question is not 
specific to humans, then it may be the case that certain alterations make us less than (or 
more than) human, but that would not necessarily mean that such alterations would be a 
threat to our dignity.  
IV.B. Problems with Defending a Specifically Human Form of Dignity  
It is difficult to see how there could be such a thing as ‘human dignity’ in the 
sense that humans are afforded this dignity because of their distinct biological make-up. 
It appears that a claim such as this would be an example of what Hugh LaFollette and 
Niall Shanks in their essay The Origin of Speciesism call ‘bare speciesism.’ Bare 
speciesism relies on the claim that there are biological differences between species, and 
the claim that these biological differences are morally relevant. As LaFollette and Shanks 
point out, however, bare speciesism is indefensible for several reasons, the first of which 
is because it is not possible to show how a mere biological divide is in fact morally 
relevant. In the way that bare speciesism applies to our investigation of human dignity, it 
would have to be demonstrated why the biological divide between humans and other 
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species is morally relevant and why the divide confers a special kind of dignity to 
humans.  
One of the primary reasons that LaFollette and Shanks give for the indefensibility 
of bare speciesism is that it is not possible for an advocate of bare speciesism to 
convincingly show how the biological divide between species is morally relevant 
compared to other broader or narrower divides. As LaFollette and Shanks put it, “Why 
should our primary classification (whatever that means) be our species rather than 
biological class (mammals), biological order (primates), sub-species distinctions (race), 
or cross-species distinctions (gender)?”  As they also point out, “To say we are humans 
(rather than dogs or ducks) is just to say that we are members of a ‘group or population of 
animals potentially capable of interbreeding.’  
To say that we are humans in the purely biological sense, and that we possess a 
human dignity solely based on our biological classification does indeed appear to be 
indefensible. However, I do not want to dwell on this particular objection to human 
dignity for any longer, since I do not believe that it is what most individuals mean when 
they speak of human dignity. In response to the objection of bare speciesism, I think that 
most users of the term ‘human dignity’ would say that they were not referring to a dignity 
that humans possess because of their biological classification, but rather they would 
claim that they were referring to a dignity that humans possess because of some other 
characteristic of humans that is contingently connected to our species membership.  
The most obvious candidate for a morally relevant difference between humans 
and other species would be cognitive capacity. Perhaps Kass and the Council are 
referring to a human dignity that is afforded to us because of our existence as rational 
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beings. Maybe Kass and the Council are using human dignity in the Kantian sense, which 
would mean that all persons are worthy of respect and dignity such that they should 
always be treated as ends in themselves, and never as the means to an end.  
In order to determine whether or not Kass and the Council are referring to human 
dignity in the Kantian sense let us look at what Kant says in The Doctrine of Virtue. 
Regarding human dignity,  Kant says: 
But man regarded as a person - that is, as the subject of morally practical reason -  
is exalted above any price; for as such he is not to be valued as a mere means to 
an ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in himself. He possesses, 
in other words, a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for 
himself from all other rational beings in the world: He can measure himself with 
every other being of this kind and value himself on footing of equality with 
them…Autonomy then is the basis of dignity of human and of every rational 
nature. 
 
 Kant roots his sense of human dignity in a person’s ability to act as a free moral 
agent, and it is precisely because of the emphasis that Kant places on freedom and reason 
that most individuals opposed to pursuing certain alterations shy away from using the 
term ‘human dignity’ in the Kantian sense. If they were to use the Kantian sense of the 
term, then it would seem that many of the alterations that they raise concerns about would 
not violate human dignity at all, and in some cases would almost certainly strengthen or 
increase it.  
Take for example alterations that one could choose in order to increase physical 
or mental performance such as using stimulants, blood doping or genetic engineering of 
muscles. Individuals who decided to pursue such alterations are not lessening their 
dignity in the Kantian sense since they retain their freedom and ability to reason. If 
anything, they have increased their freedom, since such alterations would allow them the 
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freedom to exercise their minds and bodies in ways that were not previously possible for 
them.  
Although Kass recognizes Kant’s account of human dignity as, “The most high 
minded attempt to supply a teaching of universal human dignity” (Kass, 16), he denies 
that it is in this sense that he is using the term. After praising Kant’s attempt to explain 
‘human dignity,’ Kass says, “Yet this view of human dignity is finally very inadequate, 
not because it is undemocratic but because it is, in an important respect, inhuman” (Kass, 
17). Kass explains that he cannot accept the Kantian sense of human dignity because it 
places too much emphasis on a person’s rational will, and because, “It fails to do justice 
to the concrete reality of our embodied lives” (Kass, 17).  
In response to these types of alterations, the Council makes an interesting strategy 
shift, and begins talking not about the dignity of the individuals who pursue the 
alterations, but rather about the dignity of theindividuals’ performances once they have 
the alterations. The exact words of the Council are, “For it seems that some performance-
enhancing agents, from stimulants to blood doping to genetic engineering of muscles, call 
into question the dignity of the performance of those who use them. The performance 
seems less real, less one’s own, less worthy of our admiration” (BT, 140, emphasis 
added).  
While it remains unclear what exactly makes the performances, “less real, less 
one’s own, less worthy of our admiration,” and therefore less dignified, it is very clear 
why opponents of certain alterations would not want to use human dignity in the Kantian 
sense. Such alterations look as though they are of little threat to Kantian human dignity, 
and if an opponent of such alterations were to use the term in this sense, then the claim 
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that human dignity is violated might backfire once the listener realizes that the alterations 
actually increased the person’s freedom and capacity for rational action. It is because 
many alterations increase freedom and reason that opponents of alteration shy away from 
using human dignity in the Kantian sense. However, as Kass claims, “Not all of human 
dignity consists in reason or freedom” (Kass, 17), and so it is at this point that I would 
like to leave the Kantian sense of the term behind, despite its various merits, and turn to 
the type of dignity that Kass and the Council claim they endorse.  
V. The Concept of Human Dignity Advocated by Kass and the Council 
V.A. Human Dignity Based on Something More than just Reason and Freedom 
The kind of human dignity that Kass and the Council claim they endorse is related 
not to reason and freedom, as we have just seen, but rather is to be found in our 
embodiment as human beings. As Kass puts it: 
The account of human dignity we seek goes beyond the said dignity of “persons,” 
to reflect and embrace the worthiness of embodied human life, and therewith of 
our natural desires and passions, our natural origins and attachments, our 
sentiments and aversions, our loves and longings…Like the downward pull of 
gravity without which the dancer cannot dance, the downward pull of bodily 
necessity and fate makes possible the dignified journey of a truly human life 
(Kass, 17-18).  
 
 Similarly, the Council advocates a human dignity that arises out of a “respect for 
the given” and a respect for what is “naturally human” (BT, 287 & 292). Both Kass and 
the Council think that there is something dignified about our existence as human beings 
that is not merely rooted in either our biological classification or in our existence as 
rational beings. As both Kass and the Council recognize, it is going to be difficult to 
defend this view, but nevertheless both Kass and the Council claim that this is the kind of 
human dignity that they are referring to when they raise the concern that certain 
alterations will violate or lessen it. Hence, to provide a fair hearing to the concerns raised 
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by Kass and the Council it is important to examine the concept of human dignity as they 
conceive of it, in order to determine whether or not the kind of human dignity they 
advocate lends any credence to their argument that this is a concern that should be taken 
into consideration when pursuing certain alterations.  
 It would be unfair to say that both Kass and the Council were naïve about the 
difficulty of defending the concept of human dignity that they claim to be referring to. Of 
their concern about using such alterations and the possibility that they would violate 
human dignity, the Council asks, “But can our disquiet at such prospects withstand 
rational, anthropological or ethical scrutiny?” (BT, 286). Their concern is warranted as 
we shall see in the following examination, and as it turns out, it does not look as though 
their particular conception of human dignity can withstand rational and ethical scrutiny.  
 Kass does one better than the Council, and even anticipates and explicitly states 
some of the objections that one might make in response to his claim that human dignity is 
to be found in the embodiment of human life. In his anticipation of such objections he 
says:  
 Sophisticated modern liberals will have a hard time with such a suggestion. 
What, they may well ask, is so dignified about our embodiment? […] What is so 
dignified about being the product of chance rather than rational design? […] 
What is so dignified about having a body that is subject to disease and decay? 
[...] What is so dignified about the fact that, thanks to this mortal coil of flesh, we 
must die leaving no earthly trace? (Kass, 18) 
 
 These are all excellent questions, and as we will see it is not obvious that Kass or 
the Council provide satisfactory answers to them. 
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V.B. “The Myth of the Given” – Does the ‘Naturalness’ of Means Matter?1  
Let us begin with the way in which the Council attempts to defend its conception 
of human dignity. As was already mentioned, the Council advocates an approach to 
human dignity in which there is a respect for “the given.” In beginning its argument the 
Council identifies what it needs to demonstrate by saying:  
For only if there is a human “givenness,” or a given humanness, that is also good 
and worth respecting, either as we find it or as it could be perfected without 
ceasing to be itself, will the “given” serve as a positive guide for choosing what 
to alter and what to leave alone. Only if there is something precious in our given 
human nature – beyond the fact of its giftedness – can what is given guide us in 
resisting efforts that would degrade it. When it comes to human biotechnical 
engineering beyond therapy, only if there is something inherently good or 
dignified about say, natural procreation, the human life cycle (with its rhythm of 
rise and fall), and human erotic longing and striving … only then can we begin to 
see why those aspects of our nature need to be defended against our deliberate 
redesign (BT, 289-290).  
 
It should be pointed out that the Council fails to mention that in addition to showing that 
there is something inherently good or dignified in what is natural, it is also necessary for 
it to explain why there is something less good or something less dignified about what is 
unnatural or not “given.” It may be that there is something dignified about what is 
natural, but that does not exclude the possibility of there being even greater dignity or 
more good in what is not natural or not given. If the goal is to obtain the most dignity or 
choose the option that produces the most good, then the Council needs to show why it is 
that choosing what is not “given” is the worse option. In laying out what it needs to 
demonstrate, it looks like the Council underestimates the work it needs to do.  
Putting this issue aside, the Council proceeds in its report to show that there is, 
indeed, something inherently good and dignified about being naturally human. The 
Council attempts to do this in several related ways The first is by relying on people’s 
                                                 
1 The phrase “The Myth of the Given” is borrowed from Wilfred Sellar’s 1956 essay Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind. 
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intuitions that there is be something important about the ends we try to achieve and the 
means by which we achieve them. The Council says that “[t]here is a sense in which the 
‘naturalness’ of the means matters. It lies not in the fact that the assisting drugs and 
devices are artifacts, but in the danger of violating or deforming the nature of human 
agency and the dignity of the naturally human way of activity” (BT, 292). 
 This claim is problematic for several reasons, the first of which is that it is unclear 
what the Council means when it uses phrases such as “the nature of human agency” and 
“the naturally human way of activity.” The Council admits that it is not the mere fact that 
technology is artificial or man-made that is a threat to human dignity when it is used to 
create alterations, since there are many activities that are conducted with the assistance of 
man-made tools, for example chemotherapy, that are clearly artificial, but that would not 
be considered a threat to human dignity according to most. The use of tools and man-
made artifacts seem in fact to be a key part of the “naturally human way of activity”, so 
artificiality in itself does not appear to be a threat to the dignity or the “naturally human 
way of activity” at all.  
 The Council does not say what counts as “the naturally human way of activity.” Is 
what counts as a “naturally human way of activity” simply what most people do or what 
is considered normal? No matter what answer is given the following question can then be 
asked: on what grounds is the natural way of human activity determined to be dignified? 
The question is significant because it is not clear what the connection is between what is 
natural and what is dignified. Thus, the Council appears to fall prey to the “myth of the 
given” in two important respects. The first is that it is extremely difficult to show that a 
human “givenness” even exists, and second it is notoriously difficult to justify the claim 
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that what is “given” or natural is of moral significance. The difficulty in both cases may 
be due to the possibility that it is a myth that there exists a human “givenness,” and that if 
it did exist it would have any moral significance. By trying to demonstrate that there is 
something dignified or good about what is “given” the Council invites the standard 
is/ought problem, the result of which is that it is highly unlikely that the Council will be 
able to sufficiently demonstrate that there is something dignified in what is “given” or 
natural.  
The “myth of the given” and the is/ought problem are related to the objections 
already recognized by Kass, and despite the acknowledgement of the challenge the 
Council nevertheless fails to adequately address it and proceeds in saying that the dignity 
of the “naturally human way of activity” lies in our ability to, “[s]ense the relation 
between our doing and the resulting improvement, between the means used and the ends 
sought” (BT, 292).  
The Council goes on to say that dignity would be violated because we would only 
be able to, “[a]t best feel …[the alteration’s] effects without understanding their meaning 
in human terms” (BT, 292). The Council illustrates its point using the following example, 
“Thus, a drug that brightened our mood would alter us without our understanding how 
and why it did so whereas a mood brightened as a fitting response to the arrival of a loved 
one or to an achievement in one’s work, is perfectly, because humanly, intelligible” (BT, 
292).  
VI. Understanding the World in Human Terms 
VI.A. What Does it Mean to Understand the World in ‘Human Terms?’ 
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The Council argues that pursuing certain alterations would be a threat to human 
dignity because the effects of such alterations would not be intelligible in human terms. It 
claims that activities performed using alterations are less humanly dignified and that if 
the use of such alterations became widespread, “Human experience under biological 
intervention becomes increasingly mediated by unintelligible forces and vehicles, 
separated from the human significance of the activities so altered” (BT, 292).  
 It is difficult to decipher what the Council means when it refers to understanding 
the world in human terms, but the following quote helps to shed some light on the matter: 
Still, in those areas of human life in which excellence has until now been 
achieved only by discipline and effort, the attainment of similar results by means 
of drugs, genetic engineering, or implanted devices looks to many people 
(including some Members of this Council) to be “cheating” or “cheap.” Many 
people believe that each person should work hard for his achievements (BT, 
291). 
 
 Inferring from the above statement, it appears that by raising the concern that the 
use of technology to produce alterations will render the world less intelligible in human 
terms, what the Council means is that people will no longer have to put in the same effort 
and maintain the same degree of discipline in order to achieve their goals, the result of 
which will be that people will no longer be able to understand the relationship between 
their achievements and the role they played in obtaining them. The Council’s concern 
seems to be that people will become merely passive recipients of what used to be 
achievements, and that this passivity will undermine the “naturally human way of 
activity” and thus lessen human dignity. 
 There are two ways of understanding the Council’s concern, the first of which can 
easily be dismissed. On one reading, the Council’s concern could be understood as 
meaning that technologically facilitated alterations would make all of our current 
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activities effortless and thus leave us with nothing left to strive for. If the concern is 
understood in this way, it should be recognized that the likelihood of this occurring is 
extremely low. If history can be used as reliable indicator (and in this case I think it can) 
then the fear that using technology to create alterations will leave us with little to strive 
for is unwarranted. In the past there have been significant technological advancements, 
almost all of which have reduced the effort needed in one area of activity or another. 
Take transportation for instance. The fact that airplanes reduce the amount of effort 
needed to travel long distances has not reduced human striving. If anything, due to the 
invention of airplanes people now strive to see more during their lifetimes than they ever 
could before. Needless to say, the advancement of technology has by no means put us at a 
loss for things to strive for in today’s day and age. 
 Moreover, on this interpretation of the Council’s concern, there seems to be little 
justification for thinking that making some or even many of our current activities 
effortless would threaten human dignity. Technological advancements have over the 
course of history continually changed what we strive for, reducing the effort required in 
some activities and in turn creating new horizons for us to explore. To think that it would 
somehow lessen human dignity by reducing the effort needed in our current activities 
looks to be a naïve endorsement of the status quo, and this way of thinking suggests an 
unwarranted fear of change.  
 However, perhaps what the Council fears is not that human dignity will be 
undermined due to life becoming too easy, but rather that human dignity will be 
undermined if technology allows us to obtain the psychic rewards of accomplishment 
without actually accomplishing anything. Take for example, a young man who spends all 
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day every day lying on the couch watching TV. What if through the use of technology the 
young man could be made to feel, while he remained lying on the couch watching TV, 
the satisfaction of having accomplished something great? Imagine that through an 
alteration of his brain he could be made to feel like he had just accomplished some 
worthy feat when if fact he did nothing more than lie on the couch. It seems reasonable to 
say that there is less dignity in the life of the young man than there would have been had 
he achieved the psychic rewards of achievement by exerting some form of physical or 
mental effort. If this is the case, then perhaps upon another interpretation the Council’s 
fears are in fact warranted.   
 The second and more plausible interpretation of the Council’s concern is that by 
unconditionally pursuing the use of technology to create alterations we will reduce the 
effort, which we consider to be valuable, required in conducting certain activities and 
experiences and that by doing so we will lessen human dignity. At first glance this 
concern does appear to be legitimate, and reducing humans to mere automatons by 
allowing certain desires and goals to be satisfied through the passive receipt of 
technological alterations looks as though it would have what most would consider a 
negative impact on society. For example, many would consider there to be something 
wrong with a case in which a mother experiences the death of her child and then 
immediately takes a pill that relieves her grief and suffering so that she can avoid those 
negative feelings and continue on with her day. Our intuitions tell us that there is 
something valuable, especially in this instance, in experiencing and dealing with that 
grief, and to be able to skip over the process of dealing with it looks to be in some way 
cheap or less dignified.  
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 However, just because it looks to be this way on the surface does not mean that 
upon reflection it turns out to be so. The attempt to explain why human dignity would be 
lessened if certain alterations reduced the amount of effort needed to endure certain 
experiences or achieve certain goals still leaves open the question as to whether or not 
there is something inherently dignified about viewing and understanding our experiences 
in human terms. It may be true that there is something advantageous to understanding 
certain experiences in human terms in order to make better predictions about how to act 
towards others. In the aforementioned example concerning the mother and her feeling of 
grief toward her dead child, it may be advantageous for her to experience and deal with 
her grief because doing so would allow her to better understand what it would be like if 
another one of her children died. This in turn would make it more likely that she would 
try harder to protect her other children so as not to have to repeat her experience of those 
painful emotions.  
 Yet, just because it would be advantageous and even natural for her to work 
through the grief, it does not mean that it would be less dignified if she chose not too. If 
the mother did choose to take the pill and avoid the grief, she would still be perfectly 
capable of understanding that her child died and that it would have been better if the child 
had not died. Similarly, if the mother chose to avoid the grief by taking a pill that erased 
the memory of the child’s death altogether, it is not clear that she would possess less 
human dignity as a result. In the past, experiencing the grief was not really an option and 
therefore in order to give the experience value, other than the evolutionary advantage it 
confers on the mother by causing her to protect her other children, people would say that 
there was dignity in working through the grief. But the question arises as to whether there 
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really is something dignified about suffering through painful experiences or if assigning 
dignity to those experiences is simply an attempt to give them some redeeming quality in 
order to make them easier to endure? If one wishes to deny the latter of these two 
explanations, then an explanation needs to be given for why there is dignity in 
understanding our experiences in human terms and why it is that there is dignity in the 
“naturally human way of activity.”  
 In recognizing that intuitions about death, especially the death of children, are 
exceptionally strong, the following analogous example is offered in order to lend some 
credence to the possibility that although it may be advantageous for one reason or 
another, there might not be anything dignified about working through painful 
experiences. Consider the experience of physical pain that would result from grabbing a 
hot pot. The pain is advantageous because it causes the individual to let go of the pot and 
avoid severely burning her hand. Without the experience of pain, people would be far less 
capable of determining when they were experiencing bodily harm. Therefore, it looks like 
it would be disadvantageous to make it so that people did not experience pain.   
 Now imagine that it was possible to make it so that no one had to experience pain 
anymore and that everyone could have a sensor implanted that detected bodily harm. This 
sensor, upon detection of bodily harm, would automatically trigger the natural bodily 
response required to protect the body. If this were the case, then the ability to detect 
bodily harm in order to protect one’s body would be maintained while at the same time 
eliminating the experience of actual pain. Many would say that if technology could be 
used in such a way, it would not lessen human dignity, for where is the dignity in having 
to endure the pain associated with breaking an arm or a leg or having a headache.  
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 This example is not meant to show that it would be a good thing to eliminate pain 
if its advantageous side could be maintained by artificial means. It might be the case that 
to eliminate pain would cause severe societal problems such as causing people to behave 
more recklessly. This, however, is a separate consequence that is unrelated to human 
dignity. Similarly, in the example about the mother’s grief, the ability to avoid having to 
experience grief may have negative societal consequences, but it is hard to see where the 
dignity is in enduring that painful experience.   
VI.B. Is there Dignity in Understanding the World in Human Terms? 
The problems with saying that there is something dignified about understanding 
our experiences in human terms are akin to the already mentioned problem concerning 
‘human dignity’. The claim that there is something dignified about understanding our 
experiences in human terms could be taken in one of two ways. First, it could be taken as 
meaning that there is something dignified about understanding our experiences in human 
terms, in the sense that there is something about our biological make-up that enables us to 
understand our experiences in ways that other species cannot, and that understanding our 
experiences in this way is somehow dignified. This claim rings of bare speciesism, and is 
most likely not the way in which the Council wants to be understood.  
 However, the other way in which to understand their claim is to think that since 
we are rational beings we are capable of understanding our experiences in a certain way 
that non-rational beings are not capable of, and that there is something dignified about 
understanding our experiences as rational beings. As we have seen, though, neither Kass 
nor the Council wishes to treat humans as merely rational beings, and therefore they most 
likely do not want the claim to be understood as meaning that there is something 
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dignified about understanding our experiences in terms that are intelligible to rational 
beings.  
Furthermore, in addition to the ambiguity surrounding the Council’s claim about 
there being something dignified in understanding our experiences in human terms, it 
looks as though the Council is implying that there is something less intelligible about the 
effects of alterations if they cannot be understood in human terms. Using the Council’s 
own example of mood altering drugs, it is not apparent why one’s understanding of a 
mood, altered through the use of drugs, is less intelligible than if the mood was altered by 
the presence of a loved one. In both cases, the person whose mood is being altered 
understands that their mood was altered by an outside force, the drug in the one case and 
the loved one in the other, but the Council appears to claim that the experience of the 
person whose mood was altered by the loved one is more intelligible. In neither case does 
the person understand what is occurring inside of their body to create the alteration in 
mood. Both attribute the alteration to outside forces, and it just so happens that in one 
case it is a human and in the other case it is a drug. If both can identify the primary 
outside force that is responsible for the shift in mood, why does it matter that one is a 
human and that one is a drug? Is one really more intelligible than the other? What if the 
person whose mood was altered by the drug was a neurophysiologist who understood 
very well what was going on in his body? Is his experience still less intelligible even 
though he knows the exact causal mechanisms in his body that produced the mood 
change? It seems that most would say that the experience is better understood by the 
neurophysiologist despite the fact that he does not understand the experience in what the 
Council would call “human terms.”  
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The reason for pointing this out is to call into question the Council’s claim that 
technologically facilitated alterations would cause human experiences to be increasingly 
mediated by unintelligible forces. Although there may be something more dignified about 
experiences that are more intelligible, it does not look like experiences caused by the use 
of technology are any less intelligible than those caused by human interaction. People 
could very well understand what was happening to them when they use technology to 
alter their bodies. They could equally understand why they were using technology to 
create such alterations. Just as before, what the Council is probably concerned about is 
not that people would fail to understand their experiences if they were mediated by 
technological interventions, but that people would be able to achieve positive feelings 
without the effort that has historically been required. Using a drug, a person would be 
able to achieve the same feeling that she would have ifshe were seeing a loved one 
without ever putting in the effort required to establish a meaningful relationship. If this is 
the case, the Council made a mistake in trying to ground its argument that there is 
something dignified about understanding our experiences in human terms in the claim 
that experiences understood in human terms are more intelligible since experiences that 
are mediated by technological interventions look to be equally intelligible.  
VII. Conclusion 
It is necessary at this point to put a finger on exactly why it is that both the 
Council and Kass have a difficult time translating their initial revulsions about the pursuit 
of certain alterations, “Into sound moral judgments.” According to the Council, “A 
common, man-on-the-street reaction to the prospects of biotechnological engineering 
beyond therapy is the complaint of ‘man playing God’” (BT, 287). In more secular terms 
 32
Benjamin Syzek Dignity and Human Enhancement 
the Council frames the concern as being, “The hubris of acting with insufficient wisdom” 
(BT, 287). It should be granted that it is not possible to completely know what the long-
term and perhaps even short-term consequences of pursuing certain alterations will be. 
There are legitimate concerns that both the Council and Kass raise, such as those related 
to safety and freedom, which need to be taken into consideration before decisions are 
made.  
As was mentioned in section VI.A, the Council’s and Kass’ primary concern 
seems to be that there is something valuable about our way of life in that it requires effort 
and discipline to satisfy our desires and to achieve our goals, and that to reduce humans 
to passive, unemotional machines through the unrestricted pursuit of technology to create 
alterations would lessen human dignity. In raising this concern, they fail to provide a 
satisfactory account of why we would choose to pursue and use the alterations they are 
warning against if we do in fact value our current effort filled way of life.  
Putting aside for the moment the case of genetically engineering children, the 
Council provides a weak explanation of why, in a free society, we would pursue certain 
alterations that would lessen our human dignity. What the Council says is that while we 
many not be overtly forced to use and pursue these alterations, we will be subtly forced to 
use them through peer pressure and the desire to conform. In providing this explanation 
the Council could be saying one of two things. First, they could be saying that people will 
be unaware of the fact that pursuing these technological alterations is a threat to our 
human dignity, and therefore because of both their unawareness and desire to conform 
people will choose to use technology to create alterations. If unawareness of the potential 
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harm is all the Council and Kass are worried about, then it looks like all that is needed is 
to inform the public about the threat to human dignity.  
More likely, though, is that Kass and the Council are concerned that even if 
people are made aware of the threat to human dignity they will still choose to pursue 
these alterations because of peer pressure. In other words, Kass and the Council believe 
that people are weak-willed and will be subtly coerced into pursuing these alterations 
despite their acknowledgement of the threat to human dignity. What Kass and the 
Council fail to recognize is that if people are made aware of the potential threat and still 
choose to pursue and use the alterations, then perhaps those people simply do not share 
Kass’ and the Council’s opinion that using technology in such a way is a threat to human 
dignity. Or, alternatively, perhaps they simply do not value human dignity.  
If the use of technologically facilitated alterations does become widespread, then 
it may just be that Kass and the Council failed to accurately asses the value that people 
place on our current form of life. If people do choose to use technology to create 
alterations then it may be that the form of life that they value is not threatened by the use 
of technology in this way, for if they did believe that using technology to create 
alterations decreased the value of their current way of life it seems to be a weak 
explanation to think that they would use it anyway out of peer pressure. 
 Returning to the concept of human dignity and the source of the concern that 
pursuing certain alterations are a threat to it, it appears as though this particular concern 
indeed does stem from an initial revulsion that upon analysis turns out to be indefensible. 
As we have seen, both Kass and the Council advocate a sense of human dignity that is 
rooted in what is naturally human. Despite their attempts to show that what is naturally 
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human is in some way morally significant, it turns out that there is little reason to believe 
that it is so. The fact that what is naturally human, whatever that may be, is a product of 
evolution makes it very difficult to see how or why humans by merely being human 
should be afforded a kind of dignity that would in some way be diminished by the pursuit 
of technological alterations.  
If what Kass and the Council are ultimately concerned with is our current form of 
life such that there is value in the effort and discipline required in what we currently do 
and that decreasing the required effort would decrease that value, then it looks as though 
they merely have an unwarranted fear of change. In an attempt to salvage their 
indefensible view they say that there is something dignified about our “naturally human 
way of activity,” and that this dignity would be lessened if we change our form of life by 
pursuing technology that would be used to alter the human body. To most people human 
dignity sounds worthy of preservation. However, upon analysis it is complexly unclear 
what either Kass or the Council mean when they speak of human dignity, and it is even 
less clear why it would be that if such a human dignity existed it would lessened by the 
pursuit of technology to alter the human body. This being the case, it does not appear, at 
least according to the arguments provided by both Kass and the Council, that the threat to 
human dignity is a legitimate concern that need be considered when deciding how to 
proceed in the most advantageous and ethically responsible way with respect to 
technological alterations.  
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